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FORMER NEBRASKA ORDNANCE PLANT
OU3 PUBLIC MEETING
ORDNANCE & EXPLOSIVES RECURRING REVIEW
HELD IN MEAD, NEBRASKA

DATE: MARCH 5, 2007

TIME: 7:00 P.M.

Reported by: Susan McKenzie

Videographer: John Thomas

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3
4 (Whereupon, the following proceedings were
5
6 had, to-wit:)

7
8 GARTH ANDERSON: We're now going to
9
10 start the Ordnance & Explosives Recurring Review
11
12 portion of the meeting. What I'd like to do is have
13
14 Mary Lyle lead this discussion. She's been involved
15
16 in the OE portion of the project for a number of
17
18 years.

19
20 So take it away, Mary.

21
22 MARY LYLE: Thank you, Garth.

23
24 As I talk today, there are two
25
26 handouts over on the table that will have a lot more
27
28 detail. The slides kind of were taken from this fact
29
30 sheet for Ordnance & Explosives Recurring Review.
31
32 And I also want to point out a public availability
33
34 session comment form which we'd like you guys to fill
35
36 out if you have any information on OE at the site.
37
38 And I'll kind of touch on that a little bit more as I
39
40 walk through the slides.

41
42 The reason we do -- it's a five-year
43
44 OE Recurring Review. It's basically a U.S. Army
45
46 Corps of Engineers requirement that we do this. And
47
48 we just want to make sure that previous OU Response
49
50 Actions that we conducted at the site continue to be
51
52 protective of human health and the environment. And

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3
4 the way that we go about doing a recurring review is
5
6 we look at historical documentation. The first OE
7
8 Review we did back in 2001, we basically combed the
9
10 entire administrative record for all three OUs to try
11
12 and find historical information on the OE sites. We
13
14 also -- every five years, which is why we're doing
15
16 this again, we're going to look at current site
17
18 conditions to see if there have been any land use
19
20 changes or any accessibility changes or anything new
21
22 that has come up in the past five years regarding our
23
24 OU Response Actions that we've done. And the way
25
26 that we get some of that new information is from
27
28 doing community interviews, conducting a public
29
30 availability session, which we had before this
31
32 meeting. The questionnaires here that we have out on
33
34 the table we're going to -- we've distributed those
35
36 to you all here. And then we were supposed to have a
37
38 site visit today, but unfortunately the weather kind
39
40 of prohibited that. So as soon as we get dried up
41
42 out here a little bit, we'll reschedule that. We
43
44 actually go out to the sites where we previously
45
46 conducted OU Response Actions and walk through those
47
48 and get pictures and make sure that we know what's
49
50 going on there today. And finally, after we do all
51
52 that, we'll compile it into a report that we'll put

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2
3
4 out this summer.
5

6 And the process that we go through for
7
8 our Army guidance here is we ask three questions
9
10 about the OU Response Action, are they functioning as
11
12 we originally intended, are all the assumptions that
13
14 we made initially, are those still valid, and then is
15
16 there any new information that would lead us to
17
18 believe that those OU response actions are not
19
20 protective.
21

22 And there are five sites that we
23
24 focused on as areas of interest for OE. And here's
25
26 kind of a map -- actually on your handouts, the
27
28 culvert area is misrepresented. I think we initially
29
30 had it on the east side of Load Line 1 plume, but
31
32 we've corrected the slide here, it's actually on the
33
34 west side of the Load Line 1 plume. And I'm going to
35
36 try and talk loudly, but I'm going to go over to this
37
38 map over here. We have an aerial photo here where
39
40 we've kind of boxed out on the culvert area so you
41
42 can kind of just see on an aerial photo what's over
43
44 here. Site 5, we did a clearance -- and I'll show
45
46 some pictures actually. It's kind of a six-acre plot
47
48 of land where we cleared four feet off the surface
49
50 for Ordnance and Explosives. And then there's kind
51
52 of a little hodge-podge at the other four areas

1
2
3
4 around the NRD reservoir, the potential landfill area
5
6 that we talked a little bit about in OU3, another
7
8 landfill area kind of to the southeast of the
9
10 reservoir, the proving range, which is Site 9, and
11
12 then the north burning ground which is Site 10. So
13
14 if you want to come up here after we're done later
15
16 on, it might be a little bit more clear. And all of
17
18 these areas are actually not on -- they're not
19
20 privately owned. It's university property or Army
21
22 property.

23
24 And just to kind of go through the
25
26 history a little bit, we've had four I guess
27
28 Removal/Response Actions for OE. And the first one,
29
30 as I talked about on Site 5, we cleared a six-acre
31
32 plot of land where we actually took four feet off of
33
34 the top of the six-acre land to clear for OE and then
35
36 we filled it back in. And I'll show actually a
37
38 picture of the area what it looks now today. And
39
40 that area has been cleared for non-intrusive
41
42 activities, and it can still -- but for the purposes
43
44 of this Removal Action, it's been cleared for OE for
45
46 that top four feet.

47
48 As Lisa was talking about a little
49
50 bit, when they drained the reservoir percent of the
51
52 OU3 supplemental RI work, there were some partial

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2
3
4 bomblets that were exposed that were underneath the
5
6 shoreline, and we had a bomb squad come out and
7
8 remove those. And that was another Response Action
9
10 that we had.

11
12 The CWM acronym stands for chemical
13
14 warfare material. And there was some concern that
15
16 there had been some buried at this site. And so we
17
18 did some monitoring well sampling for several years
19
20 around that area to look for contaminants that would
21
22 be associated with that chemical warfare material.
23
24 And then we also put up signage and actually worked
25
26 with the university to put up signs and fencing
27
28 around Site 5, 8, and the NRD reservoir.

29
30 Here's going to be a series of photos.
31
32 Back beyond this fence is Site 5 where we cleared
33
34 that six-acre land, plot of land. And this is kind
35
36 of just another view of that. And there's a creek
37
38 kind of along the side here.

39
40 This is a picture of the potential
41
42 bomblet that we found as the NRD reservoir was
43
44 lowered and we had that removed.

45
46 The landfill area, Site 8, these
47
48 pictures I should -- sorry, I should have clarified
49
50 that before -- but were taken when we did the 2001
51
52 Recurring Review. So when we go out again this year,

1
2
3
4 we'll try and have a photo log of the pictures as we
5
6 do the evaluation again this year.
7

8 Here's another picture of Site 8 where
9
10 the former treatment plan is located.
11

12 And then this is just an example of
13
14 one of the signs that's outside the NRD reservoir
15
16 that has been posted to warn people about the
17
18 potential for Ordnance in this area.
19

20 And as I mentioned before, we did our
21
22 first Recurring Review in 2001, which was roughly
23
24 about five years after we cleared the culvert area,
25
26 Site 5. And that document -- we didn't have any
27
28 land use changes or accessibility changes to these
29
30 five areas that we looked at, and we didn't have any
31
32 new OE incidents since we originally conducted those
33
34 Response Actions for OE.
35

36 I kind of went quickly through this.
37
38 I'll take any questions if you have any on the OE.
39

40 MELISSA KONECKY: I'm Melissa
41
42 Konecky.
43

44 What about the mustard gas?
45

46 MARY LYLE: The mustard gas is
47
48 associated with the chemical warfare material that we
49
50 looked for. And actually documented in the -- kind
51
52 of in the appendix of the OE Recurring Review report,

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2
3
4 we tried to document several interviews that we had
5
6 with people. Someone had brought it to our
7
8 attention. We physically -- during the time we were
9
10 conducting the Removal Actions, we physically met
11
12 with these people and asked them to take us out to
13
14 the site and show us, you know, where you think they
15
16 were. And I think that instituted sampling of
17
18 wells.

19
20 Did we -- were the wells existing,
21
22 Lisa, or did we install some wells for just the
23
24 purpose of -- we did install some new wells for the
25
26 purpose of --

27
28 GARTH ANDERSON: Yes, we installed a
29
30 monitoring well network around the landfill
31
32 specifically to monitor for what had been the only
33
34 breakdown products possible from this particular
35
36 substance. And after many, many, many years of
37
38 monitoring, nothing ever showed up. The compound we
39
40 were looking for is called Thiodiglycol. Nothing has
41
42 ever shown up in our monitoring.

43
44 MELISSA KONECKY: Well, what about the
45
46 incident where it was smelled in '79?

47
48 GARTH ANDERSON: Well, I just happened
49
50 to read that one this year. If you read the account,
51
52 what was actually hit did not actually exhibit the

1
2
3
4 characteristics of mustard. It was like some other
5
6 substance or it could have been an aerosol can or
7
8 something. But given the description of the
9
10 incident, it was not -- it could not have been
11
12 related to mustard itself.

13
14 MELISSA KONECKY: Did you say then
15
16 that the people who used to work there and who
17
18 reported mustard gas being dumped, that you went
19
20 there with them? Is that what you --

21
22 MARY LYLE: Well, some of the accounts
23
24 that we had heard -- I'm not sure if it was actually
25
26 the person that made the account or people that
27
28 worked on the facility that talked to someone who
29
30 made the account, but we physically came out and had
31
32 appointments one on one with people, and they
33
34 actually took us out to some of these sites where we
35
36 did do some sort of evaluation of the OU there and
37
38 the chemical warfare material. So I'm not sure if it
39
40 was the exact person or just people who could account
41
42 for those comments.

43
44 MELISSA KONECKY: It was just brought
45
46 to my attention today that this Appendix G of EPA
47
48 concerns the document that it was contained in was
49
50 just posted today actually on your website. And, you
51
52 know, it would sure be nice if we had this stuff a

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2
3
4 little earlier, at least seven days ahead, so that we
5
6 would have a chance to look at it. I mean, you know,
7
8 my computer barely downloaded and printed just the
9
10 appendix in time for me to get her and not even be
11
12 able to review it beforehand. So we need to have
13
14 this significant stuff like at least a week ahead of
15
16 time.

17
18 GARTH ANDERSON: It was in the Mead
19
20 Public Library as well.

21
22 MELISSA KONECKY: Well, and that's
23
24 been closed.

25
26 GARTH ANDERSON: I understand. You
27
28 had a little weather incident up here this last week.
29

30
31
32 MELISSA KONECKY: Yeah. And so --

33
34 LYNN MOORER: I'd just underscore that
35
36 this a perfect example of this document, this
37
38 Recurring Review that was done in 2002 is a big fat
39
40 document. And it's only because I've been spending a
41
42 lot of time at DEQ recently that I had any
43
44 opportunity to review that prior to this meeting.
45
46 That really is an example of something that needs to
47
48 be posted on the website seven days prior to the
49
50 meeting at least if you're going to have any sort of
51
52 meaningful public review -- or public comment.

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2
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4 Anyhow, let me talk a little more
5
6 about the chemical warfare material investigations.
7

8 These EPA comments are pretty
9
10 devastating I would say, in terms of their assessment
11
12 of the level of investigation that the Army did for
13
14 this Recurring Review in 2002, or the review that
15
16 culminated in the 2002 report. They note that with
17
18 respect to this chemical warfare material,
19
20 specifically the reports regarding the mustard gas,
21
22 there were two interviewees who stated unequivocally
23
24 in 1993 that ordnance containing mustard gas were
25
26 buried at the landfill. And then one of these
27
28 individuals said that eight cylinders, two of which
29
30 were leaking, were placed in 55-gallon drums for
31
32 shipping and were sent -- and they believe they were
33
34 sent to the NOP. And the EPA's review of this
35
36 information and what had been done was that they
37
38 noted that your review, the Army's review, was
39
40 completely inadequate with respect to this on several
41
42 points. And let me go through those.
43

44 Information from the three
45
46 interviewees strongly supports the probability, the
47
48 strong probability that mustard gas ordnance was
49
50 buried at the landfill, yet, the Army judged -- you
51
52 discounted that because you said this was not

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4 indisputable evidence.
5

6 Well, I submit to you, indisputable
7
8 evidence is not the proper standard for you to be
9
10 doing inquiry as to potential hazards. That's
11
12 ridiculous. 15:04
13

14 Secondly, the fact Thiodiglycol had
15
16 not been detected downstream, EPA said in their
17
18 comments that doesn't mean that chemical weapons
19
20 material isn't present, it may simply mean that the
21
22 integrity of the weapon is still intact and has not
23
24 yet leaked. And then your response to that, you
25
26 simply fell back on this, well, because there's no
27
28 historical documentation, the accounts from these
29
30 previous employees have not been substantiated by the
31
32 Army. Well, there's clearly a strong probability
33
34 right there, and you have a scientific explanation
35
36 for why your monitoring wells that haven't turned up
37
38 Thiodiglycol. That isn't a good measure. The fact
39
40 that nothing has turned up doesn't indisputably rule
41
42 out the fact that this mustard gas was buried there
43
44 as these three individuals indicate. Likewise, you
45
46 conclude simply by saying the U.S. Army Corps of
47
48 Engineers believes it is unlikely that this substance
49
50 was buried at the former NOP.
51

52 I submit to you based upon many of

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2
3
4 these extremely strongly worded deficiencies that EPA
5
6 noted in your preliminary assessment, in your extent
7
8 of geophysical investigations, deficiencies in the
9
10 selection and the testing of geophysical instruments,
11
12 deficiencies in site documentation and deficiencies
13
14 in chemical warfare materials investigations, that
15
16 ultimately all the Army did with respect to your 2002
17
18 analysis was you relied heavily upon faith-based
19
20 inquiry instead of rigorous scientific analysis.
21
22 That's not good enough. You went to great lengths to
23
24 discount ever bit of evidence there was about mustard
25
26 gas. So I want to know, what geophysical
27
28 investigations have you done to locate mustard gas,
29
30 these containers, which the information indicates
31
32 were placed in 55-gallon drums and sent to NOP for
33
34 shipping for disposal? I'm asking you geophysical
35
36 investigations.

37
38 GARTH ANDERSON: We did not do -- I
39
40 have to go back and look. I can't give you an exact
41
42 answer right now. That will be part of our response
43
44 to this. And I owe you an answer on that.
45

46 But as far as Operable Unit 3, at the
47
48 time that was part of the scope, that we had agreed
49
50 that no intrusive activities would be done in the
51
52 landfill, which is standard practice, that instead

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3
4 said we would look for breakdown products as an
5
6 indicator of its presence. Now, I'm not saying there
7
8 even is mustard in the landfill. But even assuming
9
10 there was, probably the worst thing you could do is
11
12 to go out there and start digging for it, because
13
14 that would create even a greater risk than just
15
16 leaving it where it is.

17
18 LYNN MOORER: Aren't there other ways
19
20 to test for things beneath the soil other than just
21
22 digging obviously?

23
24 GARTH ANDERSON: Geophysical doesn't
25
26 -- there's a lot of stuff in the landfill. And in
27
28 order to distinguish between one thing or another is
29
30 extremely difficult. When you're out in an open area
31
32 where you do geophysical and you find an anomaly,
33
34 then that's much simpler. But when you're in a
35
36 landfill where there's washing machines and car
37
38 bodies and, you know, who knows what else is in
39
40 there, you know, extremely difficult to pinpoint
41
42 something like that.

43
44 LYNN MOORER: I might be wrong, but I
45
46 thought I saw on the map -- perhaps it's one of the
47
48 PowerPoint -- that shows the area though of this
49
50 potential chemical weapon disposal was out off to the
51
52 southeast, it wasn't in the landfill.

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2
3
4 Let me find it.
5

6 SCOTT MARQUESS: I think it was
7
8 allegedly north of the landfill. I think an
9
10 individual had a -- there was a meeting out there,
11
12 and I think he pointed out the area in general,
13
14 maybe in the '93, '94 time frame.
15

16 Let me try and address a few things
17
18 here. We have some late breaking information on this
19
20 as of Friday afternoon actually that's kind of
21
22 interesting. A couple of things. First off, I'm not
23
24 aware of any geophysical activity to specifically
25
26 locate mustard, number one. Number two, I don't
27
28 believe that you would be able to distinguish mustard
29
30 or anything else in that area because of all the
31
32 material that's out there. You're going to find all
33
34 sorts of things. You're not going to see anything
35
36 that's going to say, ding, ding, ding, ding, here's
37
38 something like mustard. I don't think you would be
39
40 able to do that.
41

42 But take a step back. We talked with
43
44 the State Project Manager, Melissa Kemling. She
45
46 works on the Offutt Air Force Base site. And as of
47
48 Friday afternoon -- and I don't think you guys are
49
50 probably aware of this -- she sent us a copy of an
51
52 incident report from Offutt that speaks to probably

1
2
3
4 this situation. I don't know if you guys have seen
5
6 this or not. I think it was October 1960. But they
7
8 had an incident at Offutt where mustard was leaking
9
10 and they had to respond. The incident report says
11
12 that the material was buried at Offutt. There is
13
14 some -- so there's inconsistency as to whether it was
15
16 buried at Offutt or they brought it here. And that's
17
18 from the people who were firsthand on-scene
19
20 responders.

21
22 So that doesn't necessarily clarify
23
24 anything, but I believe there were three individuals
25
26 who reported that mustard was buried here. The
27
28 incident report from Offutt doesn't substantiate
29
30 that. So I don't know why the inconsistency.

31
32 LINDA WAGEMAN: Linda Wageman.

33
34 I'm going to argue this. A couple of
35
36 years ago I had received a telephone call from one of
37
38 our local NRD members and on the behalf of
39
40 individuals in this community who were responsible
41
42 for guarding these drums as they came from Offutt,
43
44 who advised me of the situation and advised me that
45
46 there was in fact, A, mustard gas, and B, nerve gas.
47
48 When I found this information out, I contacted Scott
49
50 and I told him specifically what I had found out.
51
52 Now, both he and Dr. -- I can't remember his last

1
2
3
4 name -- thank you -- Dr. Zurbuchen went ahead and
5
6 they did some research on this.
7

8 I was advised -- and evidently now I'm
9
10 making this up, which irritates me to no end. But I
11
12 was advised that the drums did in fact come from
13
14 Offutt. And I can't cite the 1963 interview, but I
15
16 remember being told explicitly of the location of a
17
18 1992 document where it was advised that there was
19
20 someone whose responsibility it was to physically dig
21
22 up these drums that were buried in Offutt to move
23
24 them.
25

26 So I don't disagree with Melissa at
27
28 all that those drums were buried at Offutt. But it
29
30 sounds to me as if the whole story isn't being
31
32 completed here. Because what we have here,
33
34 gentlemen, is you've got a series of local residents
35
36 whose job it was to work at the plant, whose job --
37
38 they were in the military. This was their job. And
39
40 they are telling you what's out there. And then you
41
42 in turn are telling them that they are in fact
43
44 wrong.
45

46 GARTH ANDERSON: Thank you.
47

48 LYNN MOORER: I found the map that I
49
50 was searching for. This is a part of the Recurring
51
52 Report -- OE Recurring Review Report for 2002. And

1
2
3
4 this is Figure 3-1. So this portion that I've got --
5
6 where my finger is that's highlighted, you see that's
7
8 where it says, "Approximate location of suspect CWM
9
10 burial." And that is much farther -- it is not in
11
12 the landfill. It is much farther southeast. It's by
13
14 the bridge Linda says. The Figure 3-1, "Sites" --
15
16 and it's labeled "Sites Relevant to the Reported
17
18 Disposal of CWM at the Former Nebraska Ordnance
19
20 Plant.

21
22 LINDA WAGEMAN: Lynn, all they need to
23
24 do is go back --

25
26 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: We can't get it on
27
28 the record.

29
30 LINDA WAGEMAN: You'll get it on now.
31
32 All you need to do is go back to your
33
34 notes from previous RAB meetings of I would say maybe
35
36 about a year and a half to two years ago. And
37
38 providing that your notes are as explicit and
39
40 detailed as you have been telling us for years, you
41
42 will find this documentation.

43
44 Now, naturally it's probably not there
45
46 because it's kind of a hit and miss as to what you
47
48 guys choose to put in there. But I guarantee you
49
50 we've got it on tape. And it is there. So what you
51
52 guys need to do is you need to look for it. Because

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2
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4 I'm telling you right now, it's got to be there,
5
6 you're going to find it, you're going to move heaven
7
8 and earth, and you're going to find all of the
9
10 financial funds necessary to rip that place apart
11
12 until you can say on your life that it is not there.
13
14 And you can't do that. And as far as equipment,
15
16 telling us, oh, it's not there, we can't find this,
17
18 there are archeologists all over the world that have
19
20 these little devices that can find cities below
21
22 cities below cities. And these guys aren't the
23
24 Army. I don't understand why you can't do that. I
25
26 know you can. You probably have a few of those
27
28 machines scattered around. So don't turn around and
29
30 tell me that you're not capable of doing it because
31
32 you are. It's a matter of what you're willing to do
33
34 and what you're not willing to do. And damnit, you
35
36 will do it.

37
38 LYNN MOORER: I would like to note
39
40 that among the many things that are very troubling
41
42 about EPA's comments from 2002 is the repeated
43
44 notation that you all did a very inadequate document
45
46 search or paper type investigation with respect to
47
48 looking for documentation. And the commenter noted
49
50 in comment 3D that -- and these are comments prepared
51
52 by TechLaw, who's a contractor for EPA -- it says, "It

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2
3
4 should be noted that based on TechLaw's experience at
5
6 other Army and military sites across the nation,
7
8 systematic and comprehensive production and disposal
9
10 records are not typically maintained. It is
11
12 therefore not an uncommon occurrence for unexpected
13
14 source areas to be identified throughout the RI/FS
15
16 process," close quote.

17
18 So that's basically saying what they
19
20 have said repeatedly in the previous comments, about
21
22 three or four pages worth, is just because you didn't
23
24 find documentation that supports what any of these
25
26 interviewees said does not mean it's not so. As a
27
28 matter of fact, to the contrary based upon TechLaw's
29
30 experience, and this was apparently adopted by EPA,
31
32 that it is unusual to find systematic and thorough
33
34 documentation of this sort. And so your inability or
35
36 lack of finding this documentation should not be used
37
38 as a rationale for failing to carry out further
39
40 investigation.

41
42 But all throughout the Corps
43
44 consistently answered many of EPA's concerns by
45
46 saying that because there was no documentation to
47
48 indicate that certain activities were carried out at
49
50 a particular location, therefore, there was no need
51
52 to investigate further. I would like the record to

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4 reflect I find that extremely troubling. I am very
5
6 concerned about that attitude.
7

8 There are countless examples I know in
9
10 my experience all across the country of dangerous
11
12 materials that are being buried in undocumented
13
14 places. Once it becomes known that a place is a
15
16 dump, all manner of things end up there. So please
17
18 let the record reflect and please understand that my
19
20 concern is extreme with respect to your inadequate
21
22 investigation to this point as to any unexploded,
23
24 exploded, any sort of related explosives or ordnance
25
26 type devices on the site. And the criticism that EPA
27
28 provided you in 2002 I think is quite scathing on
29
30 balance. There are 18 pages of very tough criticism
31
32 here.
33

34 I would like to know, Mr. Marquess,
35
36 what is the status of these comments, or shall we
37
38 say, do these continue to be EPA's views of where the
39
40 situation was as of the time this was printed in
41
42 2002? Do you understand what I'm asking? Has there
43
44 been some sort of an update or a change in view on
45
46 EPA's part with respect to the areas that are
47
48 critiqued here?
49

50 SCOTT MARQUESS: Well, I would say we
51
52 still support those comments. And part of what we're

1
2
3
4 going to do as part of the rest of OU3 is to
5
6 incorporate -- is to make sure that all the ordnance
7
8 related issues are wrapped up and addressed in our
9
10 remedy, be it land use controls, be it any other need
11
12 for any other intrusive remediation, whatever, we
13
14 want to wrap all those things up including ordnance
15
16 in the final OU3 ROD.
17

18 LINDA WAGEMAN: Back to the gas stuff.

19
20 So the people out here are telling the Army there's
21
22 junk out here. The Army puts the blindfold on,
23
24 attempts to walk a straight line, says, oh, we don't
25
26 see anything, while looking in the wrong spot, and
27
28 yet we say -- and there are many, many, many of us,
29
30 and I could count you on the one hand, and you're
31
32 saying no. I want to know what you're going to do
33
34 about it. Because I'm going to be honest. I'm tired
35
36 of coming here and fighting for rights. I don't
37
38 think I should ever have to be in attendance here.
39
40 But when it comes to mustard and nerve gas and my
41
42 reputation for being a liar, which takes it to a very
43
44 strong personal level for me, that's where we cross
45
46 the line, boys. And I want to know what the Army is
47
48 prepared to do knowing that we have a conflict here.
49

50 Now, Garth, you may or may not be
51
52 authorized to answer that question. And if that's

1
2
3
4 the case, I respect that. But also understand, like
5
6 I have in the past, I will get an answer to this.
7

8 GARTH ANDERSON: And your answer is
9
10 correct that I can't commit to any action at this
11
12 point. We have different offices in the Corps of
13
14 Engineers that specialize in Ordnance and Explosives.
15
16 And, you know, they take the technical lead on that,
17
18 and we do -- we perform actions that are reasonable
19
20 and thorough and, you know, in accordance with all
21
22 the standards. So I can't say specifically what the
23
24 Army would do. We certainly appreciate the public
25
26 comment and the input on this to bring things to our
27
28 attention that we may not have known before.
29

30 LINDA WAGEMAN: Well, that's -- thank
31
32 you for that response. You have known about it.
33
34 It's in your notes. I followed up on it a couple of
35
36 years ago. This data came from me from an NRD member
37
38 and then proceeded to get reconfirmed and reconfirmed
39
40 over the course of time. I did my duty as a citizen
41
42 and as a resident to put the EPA on alert, and then
43
44 they turned around and did the checking. So this
45
46 isn't anything new. You know, we've got all this
47
48 stuff on tape. You guys have been advised of it. We
49
50 know that the trucks came in at night. We know that
51
52 they were dumped at night. We know where they came

1
2
3
4 from. We know primarily where they're located, and
5
6 they're not in the landfill. They're near it, but
7
8 they're not there. So if the Army's response is,
9
10 we've done an adequate job, I would like to know in
11
12 what. Because it's obviously not note taking; it's
13
14 obviously not listening to the community; it's
15
16 obviously not follow-up; it's obviously not working
17
18 in succession with the EPA; and it's obviously not in
19
20 working hard and diligently to protect the citizens
21
22 of this community. We are not talking about
23
24 pesticides.

25
26 Again, as I've mentioned to you, this
27
28 is a project to you and it's your pension; it's life
29
30 to us out here. So we really need as human beings to
31
32 be diligent on this and stop thinking of this
33
34 situation as this is my role because I work for these
35
36 people or this is my role because I work for these
37
38 people. Because in the end it doesn't matter, it
39
40 honest to God does not matter.

41
42 You said a couple of years ago you
43
44 couldn't add monitoring wells because you didn't have
45
46 the money. The people in this community fought and
47
48 bickered and yelled and screamed. And Garth, you
49
50 weren't here at that time. I was on the phone with
51
52 your chief; I was on the phone with your Colonel.

1
2
3
4 And miraculously one and a half million dollars was
5
6 found to incorporate more monitoring wells. Now, I'm
7
8 sure we robbed Peter to pay Paul. That's what Steve
9
10 told me. But the reality is they were a necessity,
11
12 and the necessity was met. I'm expecting the same
13
14 thing to go with the mustard gas.

15
16 LYNN MOORER: I underscore what Linda
17
18 just said. For the record, on the map on Figure 3-1,
19
20 I think I figured out with Mr. Marquess' help that
21
22 this area off to the southeast is actually the legend
23
24 for the map. That's not the actual location you see.
25
26 But we are talking about being in the landfill. So I
27
28 do want to clarify that.

29
30 One last question I wanted to ask
31
32 about the reservoir. I did find in this
33
34 documentation that indicates that the reservoir was
35
36 lowered in 1999. Through the remedial investigation
37
38 of OU3, approximately 25 feet of shoreline was
39
40 exposed when the water level was lowered. So clearly
41
42 the reservoir wasn't even close to being drained or
43
44 made in a semi-dry state.

45
46 My question then for you is, has
47
48 the reservoir including the submerged areas been
49
50 screened or searched for Ordnance and Explosives in a
51
52 thorough fashion, the whole reservoir? Because

1
2
3
4 partially expended bomblets, an old bomb fuse and
5
6 spent booster caps were found on the shoreline in
7
8 1999. It's possible and probably likely that there
9
10 are a lot more ordnance and explosives farther into
11
12 the reservoir in addition to whatever other junk was
13
14 already there as Lorus said. Has a complete
15
16 screening or searching for the reservoir occurred
17
18 with respect to ordnance or explosives?
19

20 GARTH ANDERSON: We screened as far as
21
22 the reservoir was drained.
23

24 LYNN MOORER: The 25 feet?

25
26 GARTH ANDERSON: Yes.
27

28 LYNN MOORER: But that's it?
29

30 GARTH ANDERSON: I'll have to get you
31
32 an exact answer on that. I don't have that right
33
34 here. We have to go back and confirm what was
35
36 actually done.
37

38 LYNN MOORER: Well, please accept this
39
40 as a very strongly held suggestion or request, that
41
42 the entire reservoir needs to be screened. You need
43
44 to figure out a way to screen that entire thing for
45
46 ordnance and explosives. Just doing 25 feet down the
47
48 shoreline is in no way sufficient.
49

50 Would you agree, Lorus?
51

52 LORUS LUETKENHAUS: (Nods head).

1
2
3
4 LINDA WAGEMAN: Or we can pretend none
5
6 of this exists. And we'll even write a report on the
7
8 same.
9

10 GARTH ANDERSON: Okay. Well, I think
11
12 that we have reached 9:00 o'clock. You may have
13
14 heard the HVAC system shut down. I don't know if
15
16 that's the university's clue that they're trying to go
17
18 home. So I really do appreciate everyone's
19
20 cooperation tonight in letting us get through the
21
22 slide presentation and leaving us a maximum amount of
23
24 time for questions and answers. I think it was a
25
26 very good exchange, and I hope we can do this like
27
28 this into the future. Thank you.
29

30 (9:00 p.m. - meeting adjourned).